I agree. I have investigated many types of incidents. We always look at the conduct, errors, actions and omissions; the safety features and protocols; and the case for mitigation or defence before, during and after each event. We want to learn the lessons from the base event and put in place a robust response to prevent the next one.
Glasgow School of Art knew about the issues through the 2006 and 2008 Buro Happold reports. In 2014, it was either about to put in a suppression system or it was already being installed. It had a major fire, and it had failures in inductions, policy, procedures and supervision from 2014. Then we do not see some of the evidence, and it has got a failure in 2018. The cause of that is yet to be determined—we know the potential causes, but not the actual cause.
I therefore would have thought that Glasgow School of Art would—this is within some of the standards—look at the reconstruction more strategically and holistically with stakeholder groups, Historic Environment Scotland, the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, building standards and specialist fire engineers. I do not even see the appointment of a specialist fire engineer between 2014 and 2018. That is one of the things that I drive people towards, along with the integration of fire, security—that is, site security and arson prevention—and resilience work through business continuity, emergency planning, what-if analysis, contingencies, disaster recovery and crisis media response.
I have provided the committee with examples from five London hospital fires. I have also provided a thick and extensive guide on historic building protection and fire safety and contingency planning from the 1980s and 1990s. All the information is there.
We recognise as experts that fragmentation makes it very hard—even for informed professionals—to find the right route. Each case is different and has added dynamics. Ultimately, this was one of the oldest working schools of art and architecture, and it is not a very good advertisement to have not one major destructive fire, but two such fires in a school of architecture. There was a reputational consideration to this.
09:45
According to “The Economic Cost of Fire”, which was produced by the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and is available through the Department for Communities and Local Government, the direct cost, which is an insurable cost, accounts for a third of the economic cost of fire. Incidental costs, reputational damage, good will loss, concern, legacy issues and speculation account for the other two thirds of the cost, which most companies do not recover.
We also have statistical inference. According to the Fire Protection Association, 60 per cent of construction fires happen when the building is 90 per cent complete, and the Glasgow School of Art fire is another instance of that.